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No slave is more deluded than one who turns dependence from a master into 
condescendence or, worse, appreciation for ‘the way things are’. This, in a nut-
shell, is the dilemmatic condition of the neoliberal subject, which Smith – para-
phrasing Adorno – poignantly ascribes to the workings of ‘the system of capital 
[…] toward blocking, nullifying or stunting the emergence of true individuality 
and a non-alienated social world’.1 The question that Smith addresses in his col-
lection of essays on Žižek and Lacan’s notion of subjectivity concerns, at heart, 
the recovery of the ‘critical capacities of a well-functioning mediating ego’,2 as 
opposed to mistaking trauma and lack for the fundamental existential condition 
of human beings, accepting instead of questioning it, a position that he suggests 
is implicit in Lacan and Žižek’s theories of subject formation.3 
1  R. C. Smith with Elliot Sperber, Democracy in Crisis: Toward a Foundational, Alterna-
tive Theory of Participatory Democracy (London: Heathwood, 2013), p. 18.
2  Ibid.; quoting David Sherman, Satre and Adorno: The Dialectics of Subjectivity (Alba-
ny, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007).
3  For an interesting discussion of this dilemma, see J. D. Taylor, ‘Spent? Capitalism’s 
Growing Problem with Anxiety’, ROAR Mag, 14 March 2014 <http://roarmag.org/2014/03/
neoliberal-capitalism-anxiety-depression-insecurity/> [31 January 2015].
The work of Žižek and Lacan provides Smith’s entry point into this debate. 
Seeing things clearly means being able to differentiate between them so that they 
don’t remain a blur. This entails distinguishing our experience of some ‘thing’ in 
contrast to another – in much the same way as we ‘see’ white only alongside an-
other colour – so as to begin discerning the unfolding contours of what has caught 
our attention. In this spirit, then, my hope in picking up this slim collection of 
essays was that, by approaching Žižek through Smith’s critical lens (‘critical’ in 
the sense Smith uses it in: of retaining an openness to alternative philosophical 
paradigms) I could gain a better grip on the still elusive ‘thing’ that Žižek’s (and 
Lacan’s) work is for me.4 By the end, however, I felt the gain was not so much 
in the synoptic view that Smith’s book affords, juxtaposing ‘the most dangerous 
philosopher in the world’ to the likes of Sartre and Adorno. It was, instead, in 
the awareness that ‘tentativeness’ – that of my earlier engagement with Žižek, as I 
stayed open to his body of work while it simultaneously remained ambiguous for 
me – is not something to expunge. Quite the opposite: dwelling in the experience 
of some ‘thing’ while remaining attuned to the possibility that it might become 
for us other than what we hold it to be at present, is precisely the sort of practical 
orientation that Smith tries to advance in his collection of essays. And the politi-
cal consequences of cultivating this attitude through experiments like Occupy, as 
I hope to illustrate below, are intensely gripping; they disclose nothing less than 
the promise to recover a sense of effective mediation and agency – the possibility 
of making a difference to one’s sociohistorical conditions – from the ruins of the 
neoliberal deformation of the subject.
Smith’s book, issued by the publishing imprint of the Heathwood Institute,5 
is divided into three parts, devoted respectively to Lacan’s theory of subject de-
velopment, Žižek’s reliance on it in his own political philosophy and, finally, the 
alternative theory of the ‘mediating subject’ that Smith draws out, in dialogue 
with the works of Adorno and Horkheimer among others.6
In the first part, Smith introduces his reading of Lacan’s treatment of the Oe-
dipal phase in early child development as it being constitutive of the acquisition 
of subjectivity. In other words, the process of becoming a subject Lacan under-
stands - in Smith’s presentation of it - as one of fundamental enclosure of the 
child from their immersion in a condition of sensory entanglement; an enclosure 
that creates a constitutive sense of lack. During the ‘mirror phase’, for instance, 
4  R. C. Smith, The Ticklish Subject? A Critique of Žižek’s Lacanian Theory of
Subjectivity, with Emphasis on an Alternative (London: Heathwood, 2013), pp. 98–9. Subse-
quent references are to Smith, Critique.
5  ROAR Collective, ‘Heathwood: Critical Theory for Revolutionary Practice’, ROAR 
Mag, 4 March 2014 <http://roarmag.org/2014/03/heathwood-occupy-critical-theory/> [ac-
cessed 31 January 2015].
6  Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London: 
Allen Lane, 1973).
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the child becomes, so to say, ‘entrapped’ in their image as reflected in the mirror: 
they are animated by the unattainable desire for the stable, coherent self in the 
mirror, an idealisation that is not matched in the child’s experience of themselves 
outside of the mirror.7 Likewise, the child’s Oedipal desire directed towards the 
mother is resolved as the child gives up incestuous fantasies upon being inducted 
in the realm of culture and order (what Lacan terms the acceptance of the ‘Name-
of-the-Father’).8 In this sense, therefore, the child is properly constituted as a 
subject through a process of double enclosure that culminates with their being 
assimilated into a symbolic order. As Smith puts it: ‘the zero-point in terms of 
subject development [for Lacan] is precisely at the point of the infant’s introduc-
tion to the symbolic order by the father’.9 
Smith builds on this interpretation of Lacan to criticise him for assuming that 
the Oedipal phase – the point at which authority first encroaches on the infant’s 
openness to the world – is not so much a distortion, but rather an ontological 
necessity.10 In other words, Lacan raises the deformation of a subject’s efficacy in 
the Oedipal phase to a paradigm for the acquisition of subjectivity, rather than 
framing it as the resultant of a fundamentally traumatic process.11
In Part Two, Smith then takes issue with Žižek’s reliance on Lacan’s theory of 
subject formation for the purpose of establishing the opposition between the Real 
and the Symbolic, with the latter establishing the conditions for the expression 
of human subjectivity. In this sense, if a subject only becomes such through an 
imposition (of language) that enables absolute signification, Žižek’s political phi-
losophy never fully manages to wrangle free of the need to posit some orientation 
towards authority. Smith substantiates this point by suggesting that, if one begins 
to tackle Žižek from his roots in Lacan’s theory of subject formation, the view 
one likely ends up with is of the subject as ‘in need of taming’: an approach that 
fundamentally mirrors and underlies authoritarian pedagogies.12 Because of his 
Lacanian roots, moreover, Žižek ends up in the paradox that emancipation of the 
subject can only occur through a new submission: ‘in order for the individuals to 
“reach beyond themselves”, to break out of the passivity of representative politics 
and engage themselves as direct political agents, the reference to a leader is nec-
essary, a leader who allows them to pull themselves out of the swamp like Baron 
7  Smith, Critique, pp. 5–6.
8  Ibid., p. 2.
9  Ibid.
10  Ibid., p. 52.
11  See ibid., pp. 52, 28; cf. pp. 38–9, where Smith describes the subject as being effec-
tive in changing the sociohistorical conditions they are born into.
12  Ibid., pp. 49, 53.
Munchhausen, a leader who is “supposed to know” what they want’.13 For Smith, 
however, just like the Oedipal phase is a stunting developmental contingency, and 
not a necessary step to constitute oneself as a subject, so too is this (submissive) 
political subjectivity – which Žižek takes for granted – merely the outcome of a 
historical deformation. Namely, it is the realisation of a docile bourgeois subject 
– in opposition to the ‘mediating subject’ – that ‘intentionally constricts or nar-
rows the horizon of experiential possibility by forcing the world of phenomena 
into pre-formed (already existing) frameworks of “rational” assumptions, labels, 
concepts, or objectifications’.14
In contrast to Žižek (and Lacan), Smith advances the possibility of a much 
more open form of subjectivity: one grounded (to refer to Adorno) in non-iden-
tity thinking,15 meaning a non-objectifying orientation that dwells in the phe-
nomenon and remains open to it, a form of reason that Adorno himself termed 
‘mimesis’.16
For this purpose, Smith starts from an alternative picture of child develop-
ment; one where the infant is understood to be ‘already active and blossoming’17 
before being inducted into language; the child is an agent and an effective sub-
ject from day one. Building on this view, he rejects the opposition between the 
Real and the Symbolic that presupposes an effort to fit the world into some total 
symbolic schema,18 and offers instead a sense of the world as emerging from 
the interplay of mediating subjectivities.19 Our experience of phenomena, Smith 
suggests, is always excessive, in the sense of manifesting an endless potential for 
novelty. At the same time, however, this novelty deploys itself within a history of 
previous sense experiences through which the phenomenon has come into being, 
and through which it has acquired some kind of identity,20 albeit one that is al-
ways provisional, as every subject (and that again includes phenomena) is always 
on the way to revealing hitherto latent aspects of itself.21 It is in this sense that 
Smith can say that the world of experience emerges out of the mediation between 
what something has intersubjectively revealed itself to be over time, and what it 
13  Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Simple Courage of Decision: a Leftist Tribute to Thatcher’, New 
Statesman, 17 April 2013 <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2013/04/sim-
ple-courage-decision-leftist-tribute-thatcher> [accessed 31 January 2015].
14  Smith, Critique, p. 61.
15  Ibid., p. 70.
16  Ibid., 100; quoting Adorno, Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1973).
17  Ibid., p. 11.
18  Ibid., p. 58.
19  Where he understands subjects to not be just humans, but any phenomena manifest-
ed in experience; see ibid., p. 65.
20  Ibid., pp. 64, 67.
21  Ibid., pp. 73–5, 110.
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could be as it unfolds further: ‘a theory of the “mediating subject’ [emphasises] 
the alternative of keeping open to the world, to not absolutize the world of things 
(i.e., a critique of identity thought) to allow for and in fact affirm the unfolding of 
the many dimensions of life and experience in history, and to ceaselessly and norma-
tively reflect on the continuity of knowledge and the constantly revealing nature of all 
experience (and therefore knowledge)’.22 
By positing the possibility of constant mediation – stemming from openness 
to novelty and the particulars of experience – Smith further draws our attention 
to the implicit ethical and political responsibility in our ‘everyday’ relating. To 
operate in a non-objectifying paradigm that moves beyond the reifying tendency 
of identity thinking23 requires a willingness to remain responsively engaged with 
a phenomenon, taking any generalisation as always tentative and open for further 
specification, refinement or reconfiguration. In this sense, therefore, ethics is very 
much entwined with the question of the world’s mattering and the quality of our 
participation in it: a control-oriented approach that tries to monologically deter-
mine what matters and how it comes into being is ultimately a rejection of the 
contingent and the innovative. It is, in other words, the stunting of incipient new 
forms of life that reveal themselves as they body forth intersubjectively. In this, his 
position is close to Karen Barad’s view that ‘ethics is not simply about responsible 
actions in relation to human experiences of the world; rather, it is a question of 
material entanglements and how each intra-action matters in the reconfiguring 
of these entanglements, that is, it is a matter of the ethical call that is embodied 
in the very worlding of the world’.24
At its heart, then, the ‘identity thinking’ that Smith criticises is rooted in a 
particular idea of knowledge, whereby it is meant to provide an absolute foun-
dation for action, rather than just a provisional footing: ‘foundation’ giving the 
sense of something immutable and fixed, whereas ‘footing’ is more suggestive of a 
station in wayfaring. In this sense, power is intimately bound up with knowledge 
production insofar as an absolutist understanding of knowledge grounds the need 
for power to provide that (ultimately elusive) foundation.25 
Building on this idea that a foundationalist theory of knowledge grounds the 
need for power, Smith goes on to offer a different take on what goes on as one 
22  Ibid., p. 96, my italics. See also ibid., p. 113; quoting Sherman, The Dialectics of 
Subjectivity.
23  So that conceptual abstraction becomes divorced from experience, as exemplified in 
accusations levied at ‘the Jews’ in Nazi propaganda (see Smith, Critique, p. 69) and, perhaps 
closer to us, in the blind anti-immigrant rhetoric from the likes of the Cameron government 
and, of course, the infamous Nigel Farage (see Chitra Nagarajan, ‘We Need to Change the 
Very Language We Use to Talk about Immigrants’, New Statesman, 15 August 2013).
24  Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
Matter and Meaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 160.
25  Smith, Critique, p. 86.
learns, in support of an alternative, non-totalising social and political project. 
This point, one that is central to this book, requires that one begin with a notion 
of the subject that does not presuppose the establishment of some kind of sym-
bolic order (‘a one-dimensional and abstract frame of reference’),26 as assumed 
by Žižek, and Lacan before him. In contrast to them, Smith outlines a theory of 
‘experiential coherence’, whereby phenomena ‘appear’ and therefore become real 
and true as the different forms of being in which they manifest their qualities 
‘cohere’. So, for instance, he mentions ‘a bodily truth, a technical truth, a senso-
ry truth, an emotional truth, a psychic truth, an imaginative truth, an aesthetic 
truth, a lingual truth, and a cognitive truth’:27 a phenomenon appears through 
the mediation and quest for fittingness (amidst ‘intersubjective tension’)28 and 
the resonance across all of these possible dimensions of being, and its appearance 
looks very much like an attempt to stabilise and square together this incipient 
experiential world through continuous responsive engagement with the phe-
nomenon itself. Experiential coherence, therefore, ultimately emerges through 
an ongoing process of mediation between subjects: both the person who experi-
ences a phenomenon and the phenomenon itself that bodies forth and discloses 
itself more richly in dialogical responsiveness to the person’s tentative probing. 
A theory of experiential coherence is therefore compatible with an understand-
ing of phenomena as time-shapes,29 in the sense of something shining through 
an atmosphere of previous manifestations of itself across a range of experiential 
dimensions,30 while still retaining an orientation towards new, as-yet-unrevealed 
possibilities for being.31 Because of the shape-shifting character of phenomena 
(including social phenomena)32 in their intersubjective unfolding, then, even if it 
is still possible to categorise things, categories are never fixed, but rather they flow 
in dialogue with the particulars of experience.33
This perspective informs a different gaze into the social. With eyes no longer 
fixed on a monological symbolic order, but rather open to catching incipient 
novelty in the unfolding of a (social) phenomenon, it finally becomes possible 
to obtain a glimpse of emerging lifeworlds in the prefigurative experiments that 
Smith enumerates: from alternative educational paradigms and institutions (such 
as the Summerhill school, the works of whose founder, A.S. Neill, he references 
26  Ibid., p. 98.
27  Ibid., p. 105.
28  Ibid.
29  John Shotter, Cultural Politics of Everyday Life: Social Constructionism, Rhetoric and 
Knowing of the Third Kind (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993), p. 118, 227 n12.
30  Smith, Critique, p. 108.
31  Ibid., p. 110.
32  Ibid.
33  Ibid., p. 109.
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32  Ibid.
33  Ibid., p. 109.
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copiously), to Occupy assemblies.34 A theory of knowledge of this sort, in fact, 
offers a footing through which to begin to see the incipient reality of alternative 
‘sociohistorical’ conditions. In this sense, it fulfills the aspiration voiced, for in-
stance, by Tim Ingold, to turn the practice of knowing into an opportunity ‘to 
open up a space for generous, open-ended, comparative yet critical inquiry into 
the conditions and potentials of human life’, joining ‘with people in their spec-
ulations about what life might or could be like, in ways nevertheless grounded in 
a profound understanding of what life is like in particular times and places’.35 
Not just that, Smith’s non-objectifying orientation offers  ‘“road signs” needed 
to help navigate a change of coordinates in the process of changing our present 
sociohistorical situation’.36 By this, I mean that Smith tries to offer not just a way 
of seeing alternative forms of sociality in their happening, but it also offers an 
anticipation to guide our relating within them, through an ethos of openness to 
their continued unfolding and evolution over time, so as to avoid their reification 
into packaged alternatives and embrace instead their evolving nature. A nature 
that demands our involvement as participant parts, and not as subjects of a new 
hierarchical system of signification that – like all ‘bad generalisations’ – would 
paradoxically prolong the alienation from life as it expresses itself through phe-
nomena (an alienation that Smith traces at least to the Enlightenment’s yearning 
for mastery and control).37
What are we to do with Žižek, then? Perhaps a little, but perhaps still a lot. 
Scholars committed to Žižek may read in the Slovenian philosopher’s work more 
than what Smith does. This is because ‘Žižek’ itself is a living tradition of argu-
mentation, a subject not an object, that manifests itself in dialogue with readers 
that express their ‘phenomenological freedom’ in reacting to it in different possible 
ways than Smith does.38 And the same goes for Žižek’s writings, which can lend 
new qualities to observers ready to grasp them. If anything, then, a hypothetical 
response to Smith, contending that Žižek has been misunderstood in his script, 
would be less of a rebuttal, and more of a manifestation of the very point that 
Smith is trying to make: that subjects (readers of Žižek) interact with other sub-
jects (the literary and argumentative tradition presenced in the works of Žižek), 
to etch new meanings that escape any essentialised characterisation. In this, then, 
lies the great value of Smith’s theory, that it is able to accompany even the process 
by which others committed to developing Žižek’s thought might want to react to 
34  See, for example, Alexander Sutherland Neill, Summerhill: A Radical Approach to 
Child Rearing (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961).
35  Timothy Ingold, ‘Knowing from the inside: Reconfiguring the Relations between 
Anthropology and Ethnography’, Magisterial lecture presented at the Universidad Nacional 
de San Martin, Buenos Aires, October 25, 2012.
36  Smith, Critique, p. 117.
37  Ibid., p. 109.
38  Ibid., p. 63.
his book, articulating their own inclination to remain open to the Žižek’s work 
and find ways to make it speak beyond any definitional constraints put around it. 
For this reason, this will be a terrific read not just for those puzzled by Žižek and 
wanting to put in words their uncertainty, but also to the Žižek scholar that may 
find here the source of new orientations and hermeneutical possibilities beyond 
the limitations highlighted in Smith’s incisive and insightful polemic.
Luigi Russi is the Arturo Labriola Research Fellow at the International University 
College of Turin and an alumnus of St. Hugh’s College, Oxford.
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